Introduction
Can an investigating agency keep a person under physical restraint for several hours, complete search and seizure formalities, and then record a later time of arrest to make the detention appear legally compliant?
The Supreme Court of India has now addressed this issue directly in Sri Sujit Das and Others v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 1195, decided on 5 November 2026.
In this significant judgment, the Supreme Court clarified that the 24-hour period prescribed under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India begins when a person’s liberty is actually curtailed through detention, and not merely from the time of formal arrest recorded in the arrest memo.
The Court rejected the concept of an investigative ‘buffer zone’ during which an individual could remain under the control of an investigating agency without triggering the constitutional safeguard of production before a Magistrate.
The ruling has important implications for criminal defence practitioners, particularly in cases involving the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), where investigating agencies frequently undertake extensive search, seizure, sampling and interrogation procedures before formally recording an arrest.
For advocates handling NDPS bail applications, remand proceedings and constitutional challenges to illegal detention, this judgment provides an important legal and practical framework.
1. The Practical Problem: Detention Before Formal Arrest
Criminal defence practitioners frequently encounter situations where investigating agencies, including the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Customs authorities, State Anti-Narcotics Task Forces, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED), intercept an individual during an investigation.
The agency may subsequently:
- Seize the individual’s vehicle, mobile phone or other belongings.
- Recover suspected contraband or other incriminating material.
- Conduct preliminary field tests and search operations.
- Transport the individual to an agency office or headquarters.
- Conduct further questioning and investigative procedures.
- Complete seizure documentation, panchnamas and other formalities.
- Record the formal arrest several hours after the initial interception.
The constitutional issue arises when the individual is not free to leave during this entire period, yet the arrest memo records a much later time of arrest.
For example, an individual may be intercepted at 2:00 PM on one day, remain under the physical control of the investigating agency throughout the investigation, and be formally shown as arrested at 11:00 AM the following day.
If that individual is produced before a Magistrate after the expiry of 24 hours from the initial curtailment of liberty, the question arises whether Article 22(2) has been violated.
Before Sujit Das, certain High Court decisions had accepted distinctions between temporary investigative detention and formal arrest in the context of NDPS search and seizure procedures.
The prosecution relied upon decisions such as Aryaman Pattnayak (Orissa High Court), Kannan (Madras High Court) and Arun K. Thomas (Kerala High Court) to argue that the time spent completing statutory search and seizure formalities should not necessarily count towards the constitutional 24-hour period.
The Supreme Court has now rejected this approach.
In Sri Sujit Das v. Union of India (2026 INSC 1195), the Court clarified that the constitutional safeguard cannot be postponed merely by describing an actual restraint on personal liberty as preliminary inquiry, investigation or procedural detention.
2. Sri Sujit Das v. Union of India (2026 INSC 1195): Facts and Decision
Case: Sri Sujit Das and Others v. Union of India
Citation: 2026 INSC 1195
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date of Decision: 5 November 2026
Bench: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Relevant Provisions: Article 21 and Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India; Section 58 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Sections 37, 42, 50 and 67 of the NDPS Act.
Background of the Case
The appellants were accused in an NDPS case involving the recovery of methamphetamine (Yaba) tablets.
On 29 September 2025, the investigating team intercepted the appellants at approximately 2:00 PM. During the operation, the authorities recovered narcotic substances and conducted search and seizure proceedings.
The investigation continued at the Customs Division office in Agartala, where additional contraband was recovered. The total quantity seized was 60.79 kg of methamphetamine.
The search and seizure procedure was completed at approximately 5:00 PM on 29 September 2025.
However, the appellants were formally shown as arrested only on 30 September 2025, at approximately 11:00 AM and 11:15 AM.
They were subsequently produced before the Judicial Magistrate at 4:45 PM on 30 September 2025.
The appellants contended that their personal liberty had been curtailed from the moment of interception at 2:00 PM on 29 September 2025. Consequently, their production after the expiry of 24 hours violated Article 22(2) of the Constitution.
The Union of India argued that the period preceding formal arrest was necessary to complete statutory formalities under the NDPS Act, including search, seizure, weighing, testing and interrogation.
The Supreme Court rejected this justification.
What Did the Supreme Court Hold?
The Court held that the actual commencement of detention must be determined by examining when the individual’s personal liberty was effectively curtailed.
The formal arrest memo cannot conclusively determine the starting point of the constitutional 24-hour period.
The Court further held that statutory search and seizure procedures under the NDPS Act and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022, do not create an exception to Article 22(2).
The appellants were therefore entitled to release from custody.
The Court also found that the unexplained 18-hour gap between completion of the search and seizure proceedings and formal arrest was unreasonable under Section 58 BNSS.
The High Court’s order rejecting bail was set aside, and the appellants were directed to be produced before the jurisdictional Special Court within seven days, whereafter they were to be released on bail on appropriate terms and conditions.
3. Ratio Decidendi: Nine Important Conclusions Under Paragraph 69
In paragraph 69 of the judgment, the Supreme Court summarised nine conclusions. These conclusions are particularly important for advocates dealing with illegal detention, remand proceedings and NDPS bail matters.
1. The 24-Hour Period Begins From Actual Detention
The 24-hour period under Article 22(2) begins from the date and time when the individual’s liberty is effectively curtailed.
It does not begin merely from the time recorded in the formal arrest memo.
The actual circumstances of restraint, rather than the terminology used by the investigating agency, determine when the constitutional clock starts.
2. Detention Beyond 24 Hours Without Production Requires Release
Where detention continues beyond 24 hours without production before a Magistrate, the detained individual must be released forthwith.
This is a constitutional safeguard and cannot be defeated through delayed documentation of formal arrest.
3. Only Journey Time Can Be Excluded
While calculating the 24-hour period, the only permissible exclusion is the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s Court.
Time spent on interrogation, search, seizure, sampling, weighing, administrative procedures or other investigative formalities cannot be excluded merely because the investigating agency considers those procedures necessary.
4. Contrary High Court Decisions Disapproved
The Supreme Court held that the following decisions did not lay down the correct law regarding Article 22(2):
- Aryaman Pattnayak v. Union of India (Orissa High Court).
- Kannan v. State of Tamil Nadu (Madras High Court).
- Arun K. Thomas v. Narcotics Control Bureau (Kerala High Court).
The reasoning adopted in these decisions to distinguish preliminary detention from arrest for calculating the constitutional 24-hour period was disapproved.
5. Detention Must Also Be Reasonable Within 24 Hours
The Court clarified that compliance with the 24-hour limit alone is not sufficient.
Under Section 58 BNSS, detention must not continue for a period longer than what is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.
Therefore, the investigating agency must satisfy both requirements:
- Production before the Magistrate within the constitutionally prescribed 24 hours.
- Detention for no longer than a reasonable period within those 24 hours.
6. Magistrate Must Record the Actual Time of Detention
At the time of production, the Magistrate has a duty to ascertain and record the actual date and time when the individual’s liberty was curtailed.
The Magistrate cannot mechanically accept the time mentioned in the arrest memo without examining the circumstances of initial apprehension.
The Magistrate must independently examine whether the constitutional 24-hour requirement has been satisfied.
7. Magistrate Can Decline Remand Even Within 24 Hours
Even where production takes place within 24 hours, the Magistrate must examine whether the preceding detention was reasonable.
If the Magistrate finds that the individual was detained for longer than what was reasonable in the circumstances, the Magistrate may decline remand.
This makes the scrutiny of pre-arrest detention an important part of the remand process.
8. Violation in the Present Case
The Supreme Court found that the appellants were intercepted at approximately 2:00 PM on 29 September 2025 and produced before the Judicial Magistrate at 4:45 PM on 30 September 2025.
The detention therefore exceeded the constitutional 24-hour period.
Additionally, the unexplained 18-hour gap between completion of search and seizure proceedings and formal arrest violated the reasonableness requirement under Section 58 BNSS.
9. Relief Granted by the Supreme Court
The Court set aside the Tripura High Court’s order dated 29 April 2026.
It directed that the appellants be produced before the jurisdictional Special Court within a maximum period of seven days, whereafter they were to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the Court considered appropriate.
These nine conclusions form the core of the judgment and are particularly relevant when challenging prolonged pre-arrest detention.
4. How to Counter Common Prosecution Arguments After Sujit Das
The practical value of Sujit Das lies in how advocates can use its ratio to address the arguments commonly raised by investigating agencies during remand and bail proceedings.
Argument 1: Search and Seizure Formalities Under Sections 42 and 50 of the NDPS Act Were Still Pending
The prosecution may argue that the accused could not be produced before the Magistrate immediately because the agency was required to comply with statutory search and seizure procedures.
It may also rely upon Rule 3(4) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022, which requires classification, weighing, packaging and numbering of seized substances in the presence of search witnesses and the person from whose possession the substances were recovered.
Defence Counter-Argument
The Supreme Court rejected this justification in Sujit Das.
The Court specifically observed that compliance with statutory procedures under the NDPS Act and the 2022 Rules does not prevent the investigating agency from producing the detained individual before a Magistrate within 24 hours.
The investigating agency may continue the necessary investigative and procedural work after obtaining appropriate judicial remand.
Therefore, statutory compliance cannot be used to justify keeping an individual under physical restraint beyond the constitutional period without judicial oversight.
Argument 2: Section 37 of the NDPS Act Creates an Absolute Bar Against Bail
In commercial-quantity cases, the prosecution frequently relies on Section 37 of the NDPS Act to oppose bail.
It may argue that the Court cannot grant bail unless the statutory twin conditions are satisfied.
Defence Counter-Argument
The Supreme Court in Sujit Das reaffirmed the primacy of fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution.
The Court expressed reservations about the proposition that Article 21 rights must invariably operate within the restrictions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Relying upon constitutional jurisprudence, including:
- Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713.
- Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51.
- Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166.
The Court reiterated that where fundamental rights are violated, the restrictions imposed by special statutes such as Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot override constitutional protections.
The important distinction is that a proven violation of Article 22(2) is not merely an ordinary bail consideration. It constitutes an independent constitutional ground for challenging continued detention.
Argument 3: Examination Under Section 67 of the NDPS Act Is Only an Inquiry, Not an Arrest
The prosecution may contend that an individual was merely being examined under Section 67 of the NDPS Act and had not been formally arrested.
It may further argue that the individual was required to remain present for investigative purposes and that such presence does not automatically amount to arrest.
Defence Counter-Argument
The Supreme Court rejected the concept of a constitutional buffer zone in which an individual’s liberty could remain curtailed while the 24-hour period was kept in abeyance.
The Court relied upon the principles laid down in:
- Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote, (1980) 2 SCC 559.
- Ashak Hussain Allah Detha @ Siddique v. Assistant Collector of Customs (P.), Bombay, 1990 SCC OnLine Bom 3.
In Niranjan Singh, the Supreme Court explained that a person is in custody when held by an investigating agency or other authority possessing coercive power.
The relevant consideration is whether the individual is actually under the control of the authority and deprived of freedom to leave.
A person may voluntarily cooperate with an investigation without being under arrest. However, where the person is not free to leave and is under coercive control, the investigating agency cannot avoid constitutional safeguards merely by describing the situation as questioning or inquiry.
Argument 4: The Formal Arrest Was Recorded Within 24 Hours, Therefore Article 22(2) Was Complied With
The prosecution may attempt to calculate the 24-hour period from the arrest memo and argue that production before the Magistrate took place within the prescribed period.
Defence Counter-Argument
The arrest memo is not conclusive proof of the actual commencement of detention.
The advocate should establish the precise time when the accused was first restrained and placed under the control of the investigating agency.
The relevant evidence may include interception records, seizure memos, panchnamas, CCTV recordings, official movement registers and statements of independent witnesses.
The constitutional calculation must be based on the actual curtailment of liberty, not the time selected by the investigating officer for recording formal arrest.
5. Practical Defence Strategy at the Trial Court Remand Stage
The most important opportunity to raise an Article 22(2) violation may arise at the initial production and remand stage.
Advocates should not wait until the regular bail application to challenge an unexplained period of pre-arrest detention.
The following steps can help establish the actual timeline.
1. Verify General Diary Entries and Panchnama Timings
Compare the following documents:
- Initial secret information report.
- General Diary (GD) entries, wherever applicable.
- Vehicle interception memo.
- First seizure panchnama.
- Subsequent seizure and recovery memos.
- Search authorization and related records.
- Arrest memo.
- Production and remand documents.
The objective is to establish the earliest point at which the accused was placed under the physical control of the investigating agency.
2. File an Application Seeking Recording of Actual Apprehension Time
At the time of initial production, submit a written application requesting the Magistrate to record the actual date and time when the accused was first detained and deprived of freedom of movement.
Reliance should be placed on paragraph 69(vi) of Sujit Das.
The application should specifically request the Magistrate to examine the circumstances of interception and determine whether the constitutional 24-hour period has been complied with.
3. Examine the Intervening Period Between Seizure and Formal Arrest
Identify any unexplained delay between the completion of search and seizure proceedings and the recording of formal arrest.
In Sujit Das, the Supreme Court specifically found that the 18-hour gap between completion of search and seizure proceedings at 5:00 PM on 29 September 2025 and formal arrest on the following morning was unreasonable.
A similar unexplained delay may provide an additional ground to challenge the legality of detention under Section 58 BNSS, even where the overall production period has not crossed 24 hours.
4. Seek Preservation of CCTV Footage
CCTV recordings may provide important evidence regarding the actual time of apprehension, transportation and continued physical control of the accused.
In Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljeet Singh, (2020) 7 SCC 397, the Supreme Court issued directions concerning CCTV installation in police stations and specified central investigating agencies.
The judgment addresses CCTV coverage, including entry and exit points, lock-ups and areas where interrogation or detention takes place.
In Sujit Das, the Supreme Court discussed these safeguards in paragraphs 62–64 and emphasised their relevance to preventing custodial abuse.
Advocates should promptly seek preservation of relevant footage from:
- Police stations.
- NCB offices.
- Customs offices.
- ED offices.
- CBI offices.
- Other agency premises where the accused was held or interrogated.
A timely preservation request is important because CCTV footage may be overwritten or deleted under applicable retention arrangements.
5. Object to Mechanical Remand
The defence should specifically request the Magistrate to examine:
- The actual time of initial detention.
- Whether the accused was free to leave.
- The time taken to complete search and seizure procedures.
- Whether the intervening period was reasonable.
- Whether production occurred within 24 hours, excluding only permissible journey time.
A remand order should reflect meaningful judicial application of mind to these circumstances.
6. Practical Drafting Template: Article 22(2) Violation in NDPS Bail Applications
The following drafting format may be adapted for a bail application before the High Court or the Special Court, depending on the procedural stage and facts of the case.
GROUND: VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 22(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 58 OF THE BNSS, 2023
A. That the Applicant was initially intercepted and placed under the physical control of the Respondent Agency on [Insert Date] at approximately [Insert Time], as evidenced by the contemporaneous seizure panchnama, vehicle interception memo, official records, CCTV footage and other relevant materials.
B. That from the moment the Applicant’s personal liberty was effectively curtailed, the Applicant was under the coercive control of the investigating agency and was not free to leave. Accordingly, the constitutional period prescribed under Article 22(2) commenced from the actual time of such detention and not from the subsequently recorded time of formal arrest, in view of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri Sujit Das and Others v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 1195.
C. That the Applicant was formally shown as arrested only on [Insert Date] at [Insert Time] and was produced before the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate only on [Insert Date] at [Insert Time]. The period between the actual curtailment of liberty and production before the Magistrate is approximately [Insert Duration], excluding only such journey time as is legally permissible under Article 22(2).
D. That the Respondent Agency cannot exclude the period spent on search, seizure, sampling, weighing, interrogation or other investigative formalities from the constitutional 24-hour calculation merely by describing the same as preliminary inquiry or procedural compliance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressly rejected the creation of any investigative buffer zone in Sujit Das (supra).
E. That the continued detention of the Applicant without production before the Magistrate within the constitutionally prescribed period constitutes a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India and renders the continued detention illegal and unconstitutional.
F. That the provisions of Section 58 of the BNSS, 2023, additionally require that detention should not extend beyond a reasonable period in the circumstances of the case. The unexplained delay in the present matter is therefore independently relevant to the legality of the detention and the validity of the remand proceedings.
G. That the restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot be invoked to legitimise a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution. The Applicant is consequently entitled to seek appropriate constitutional and consequential relief in accordance with the principles laid down in Sujit Das (supra).
PRAYER
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:
a. Hold that the detention of the Applicant is in violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 58 of the BNSS, 2023;
b. Direct the release of the Applicant from illegal detention and grant appropriate consequential relief, including release on bail in accordance with the applicable procedure;
c. Pass any other order or direction that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interests of justice.
Drafting note: The above is a model ground, not a universal pleading. Verify the actual detention timeline, competent authority, statutory provisions, procedural posture and applicable relief before filing. In particular, do not assume that mere presence at a search site automatically establishes detention.
7. Important Supreme Court Precedents to Cite Alongside Sujit Das
For a stronger legal argument, advocates should consider relying upon the following judgments depending on the factual and procedural context.
1. Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote, (1980) 2 SCC 559
The Supreme Court explained the meaning of custody and held that a person is in custody when under the control of an authority exercising coercive power.
The judgment is particularly relevant when the prosecution attempts to distinguish informal custody from formal arrest.
2. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416
This landmark judgment laid down safeguards relating to arrest and detention to prevent custodial abuse and violations of personal liberty.
It is relevant when challenging unrecorded detention, custodial violence and procedural violations during investigation.
3. Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713
The Supreme Court recognised that constitutional rights, particularly the right to speedy trial under Article 21, cannot be defeated by statutory restrictions on bail under special enactments.
It provides important constitutional support when examining the relationship between fundamental rights and restrictive bail provisions.
4. Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51
The judgment discusses arrest, bail and the importance of procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings.
It is useful when examining unnecessary arrests and the principles governing grant of bail.
5. Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166
The Supreme Court discussed the relationship between prolonged incarceration, the right to speedy trial and restrictive bail provisions under special statutes.
It may be relevant when Article 21 considerations arise in NDPS bail proceedings.
6. Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljeet Singh, (2020) 7 SCC 397
This judgment deals with CCTV installation and monitoring safeguards in police stations and investigating agency offices.
It is particularly useful when seeking preservation of CCTV recordings to establish the actual time and circumstances of detention.
7. Ashak Hussain Allah Detha @ Siddique v. Assistant Collector of Customs (P.), Bombay, 1990 SCC OnLine Bom 3
The Bombay High Court examined the relationship between actual restraint on personal liberty and the time of formal arrest.
It is particularly relevant in cases involving Customs and NDPS investigations where formal arrest is recorded after an earlier period of physical detention.
8. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240
The Supreme Court considered the consequences of violation of Article 22(2) and recognised the obligation of the Court dealing with bail to release an accused where the constitutional requirement has been breached.
This authority is directly relevant to the consequences of delayed production before a Magistrate.
8. Key Takeaways for Criminal Defence Practitioners
The decision in Sri Sujit Das v. Union of India is significant because it strengthens judicial scrutiny of detention preceding formal arrest.
The most important practical lessons are:
- The constitutional 24-hour period starts when personal liberty is effectively curtailed, not when the arrest memo is prepared.
- Search and seizure formalities cannot create an investigative buffer zone outside Article 22(2).
- Only necessary journey time to the Magistrate’s Court can be excluded from the constitutional calculation.
- Section 58 BNSS imposes an additional requirement that detention must remain reasonable within the prescribed period.
- Magistrates have a positive duty to ascertain and record the actual time of detention.
- Remand cannot be granted mechanically without examining the legality and reasonableness of preceding detention.
- An established violation of Article 22(2) requires release from custody and cannot be neutralised merely by invoking Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
For criminal defence advocates, the judgment provides an important basis for examining the chronology of apprehension, search, seizure, formal arrest and production before the Magistrate.
The central question is no longer simply when the investigating agency recorded the arrest. The real question is when the individual was actually deprived of the freedom to leave.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sri Sujit Das and Others v. Union of India (2026 INSC 1195) reinforces a fundamental constitutional principle: an investigating agency cannot postpone constitutional safeguards by delaying the formal recording of arrest while keeping an individual under its physical control.
Article 22(2) is not a procedural formality. It is a constitutional protection against prolonged detention without judicial oversight.
For advocates handling NDPS matters, the judgment makes it essential to scrutinise the complete chronology of detention rather than relying exclusively on the arrest memo.
At the remand stage, identifying the actual time of apprehension, examining unexplained investigative delays and seeking preservation of contemporaneous evidence may prove decisive in challenging illegal detention.
The constitutional clock starts when liberty is curtailed, not when paperwork says the arrest began.
Primary Judgment: Sri Sujit Das and Others v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 1195 – Supreme Court of India.
Legal Disclaimer: This article is intended for general legal information and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. The applicability of the judgment depends on the facts, evidence and procedural circumstances of each individual case.




